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Bowman's Beanstalk:
Patent Exhaustion in Self-Replicating
Technologies
ABSTRACT

The breakneck speed of innovation has once again brought
uncertainty to the realm of patent law in the form of self-replicating
technologies. Traditionally, the doctrine of patent exhaustion has
provided a balance between the monopolistic powers of the patent
holder and the consumer's freedom to utilize a purchased product
without future interference. The rights holder receives compensation
from the initial sale and retains the right to make and sell additional
goods, while the consumer may use or resell their particular article
without concern for additional fees or payments. Self-replicating
technology blurs this line because a consumer's use inherently includes
the making of additionalidenticalproducts.
This Note explores this issue against the backdrop of Monsanto
v. Bowman, a genetically modified seed case that has reached the US
Supreme Court. This Note argues that the Federal Circuit reached the
correct conclusion; however, its reasoning relied overmuch on previous
precedent and failed to adequately address the issues specific to this
technology or those raised by recent Supreme Court decisions. This
Note next explores the similarities between biotechnology and software
of
incidental
phenomenon
the
systems-particularly
copies-and the latter's protection under copyright in search of
applying a similar solution in patent law. Unable to find such a
solution, this Note concludes that requiring licenses for both the "right
to use" and the "right to make" for self-replicatingtechnologies ensures
the best possible balance between the patentee and consumer and
supports the underlying policies of promoting innovation and
competition.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

SELF-REPLICATING TECHNOLOGY: THE NEW FRONTIER..... 953

954
...............
A. Monsanto Roundup Ready Soy Beans
B. Software, Quines, and Self-Replicating Programs........ 955
II.

PERSPECTIVES ON PATENT EXHAUSTION

949

.................

958

950

III.

VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH LAW

[Vol. 15:4:949

A. Patent Exhaustion
..........................
.....
B. Monsanto's Legal Victories
...................
.....
1. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling..................
2. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs
....................
3. Monsanto Co. v. David ...............
......
C. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc..............

958
959
959
960
961
961

BOWMAN'S BEANSTALK

963

................................

A. Background
................................
.... 963
B. Federal Circuit Opinion .............................
964
IV.

V.

VI.

THE RIGHT TO MAKE, INCIDENTAL COPYING, AND THE
LIMITS OF PATENT LAW ..........................

966

A. The Right to Make
.........................
......
B. Incidental Copying, Software, and Copyright Law .......
1. The Essential-Step Exemption
...............
2. Licenses
.............................
....
3. Fair Use ..................................
C. The Limits of Patent Law ..........................
1. Congressional Action
..............
.........
2. Licenses
.............................
....
3. Fair Use
.............................
....

967
969
969
970
971
972
973
974
976

DUAL EXPLICIT LICENSES BEST PROTECT
SELF-REPLICATING TECHNOLOGIES
....................

977

A. Alignment with Patent Policies.....................
1. Competitive Economic Rationale ..
...........
2. Innovative Rationale...................
....
3. Why Licenses and Contracts Are Unnecessarily
Convoluted
...............................

979
979
980

CONCLUSION

982

......................................

981

Once the subject of "grey goo,"' apocalyptic scenarios, and
science-fiction
theories,
human-engineered
self-replicating
technologies have arrived. 2 Computer scientists and biotechnology
engineers have created self-replicating nano-bots and bacteria
specifically engineered to clean up oil spills. 3 Seeds are perhaps the
1.

See ERIC DREXLER, ENGINES OF CREATION: THE COMING ERA OF NANOTECHNOLOGY

172-73 (1987) (referencing a hypothetical apocalyptic scenario in which out-of-control molecular
nanotechnology consumes all matter on Earth in the pursuit of continuous self-replication).
2.
See, e.g., Kevin C. Tofel, MIT: We're One Step Closer to Self-Replicating Objects,
GIGAOM (Apr. 3 2012, 7:47 AM), http://gigaom.com/2012/04/03/mit-were-one-step-closer-to-selfreplicating-objects.
3.
See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980); Andrew B. Cushing et al.,
An Autonomous Self-Replicating Robotic System, PROC. 2003 IEEE/ASME INT'L CONF.
ADVANCED INTELLIGENT MECHANICS 137, 141 (2003); Sean Dodson, The Machine That Copies
Itself, GUARDIAN (July 2, 2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/jul/03/copy.machine.
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most classic example of reproductive technology.
They now
incorporate genetic modifications designed to immunize the plants
against herbicides and allow for greater yields in harsh climates.4
Development of reproductive technologies, such as seeds, has
not come without cost; thus, the companies that invest in such
technologies seek to protect the fruits of their efforts.5 For example,
Monsanto, an international agribusiness, spends close to $1 billion per
year on research and development of genetically engineered crops.6
Specifically, Monsanto produces a variety of seeds imbued with
genetic modifications targeted to resist damage from Monsanto's
accompanying herbicides.7
Monsanto licenses its technology to
intermediaries that manufacture and sell the patented seeds to
farmers. 8 In efforts to protect against widespread unauthorized
dissemination of these seeds, Monsanto requires single-use licenses
and restricts farmers from saving any seeds for replanting.9 The
strategy has led to widespread litigation, particularly concerning
patent exhaustion.10

reprap; Orion Jones, MIT Builds Self-Replicating Machines, BIG THINK (Apr. 5, 2012, 1:15 PM),
http://bigthink.com/ideafeed/mit-builds-self-replicating-machines.
4.
See Focus on Yields Biotech Crops: Evidence, Outcomes and Impacts 1996-2007, PG
EcON., 2-4 (Oct. 2009), http://www.pgeconomics.co.uk/pdf/focusonyieldeffects2009.pdf;
More
Beans Per Pod, More Bushels Per Acre, MONSANTO (June 24, 2010), http://rea-hybrids.com/
assets/files/GENRR2Y ProductFlier_062410[1].pdf
5.
See Why Does Monsanto Sue Farmers Who Save Seeds?, MONSANTO,
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/why-does-monsanto-sue-farmers-who-save-seeds.
aspx (last visited Jan. 27, 2013) ("Monsanto invests more than $2.6 million per day in research
and development that ultimately benefits farmers and consumers. . . . [T]he loss of this revenue
would hinder [the] ability to invest in research and development to create new products....").
6.
See Corporate Profile, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/investors/pages/
corporate-profile.aspx (last visited Jan. 27, 2013).
7.
See U.S. Technology Use Guide, MONSANTO, 17-25 (2013), http://www.monsanto.
com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Technology-Use-Guide.pdf (explaining techniques for utilizing
Roundup Ready technology in soybeans as well as alfalfa, canola, sugarbeets, and corn).
8.
Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S.
Ct. 420 (2012).
9.
See id. at 1344-45. Farmer activist websites have begun posting these agreements
on the Internet to inform others and stimulate discussion. See, e.g., 2011 Monsanto
Technology/Stewardship

Agreement

(Limited

Use

License),

THE

FARMER'S

LIFE,

http://thefarmerslife.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/scan docOO04.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2013);
2009 Monsanto Technology/Stewardship Agreement (Limited Use License), AGRIC. DEF.
COALITION, http://www.agriculturedefensecoalition.org/sites/default/files/file/agriculture-57/57S
%202011%20Monsanto%20Liability%2OAgreement%20for%2OThose%2OUsing%20GE%2OSeeds+
Crops.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2013).
10.
See Kevin E. Noonan, Patent Exhaustion Does Not Apply to Genetically Engineered
Seed, PATENT Docs (Sept. 22, 2011, 11:59 PM), http://www.patentdocs.org/2011/09/monsanto-cov-bowman-fed-cir-2011.html ("As it had in Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, Monsanto Co. v. David,
and Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, the Court in Monsanto Co. v. Bowman rejected defendant's
argument, here that Monsanto's infringement action should be dismissed under the doctrine of
patent exhaustion."); see also Bernard Chao, Non-Public Litigation: The Hidden Story of
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Established to serve as a limit on patent rights, the doctrine of
patent exhaustion has caused confusion and debate when applied to
self-replicating technologies." The doctrine holds that the authorized
sale of an article embodying the patent exhausts the patent holder's
rights in that object. 12 In other words, the buyer has the freedom to
use and resell the article as it chooses, but the patentee retains the
right to restrict others from creating copies.1 3 With self-replicating
technologies like seeds, however, using and making copies of the
invention are the same. Farmers who have purchased the patented
seeds contend that Monsanto has exhausted its patent rights and that
those farmers are free to replant the second, third, or nth generation
of crops. 14 Monsanto, however, contends that its right to restrict
reproduction extends independently to each generation of seeds, a
position that has led to continuous litigation over the past decade.1 5
In each case regarding Monsanto's seeds, the US Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit has rejected the farmers' arguments for patent
exhaustion, and Monsanto has prevailed.' 6
Recent developments have further complicated the matter.17
The Supreme Court in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.
recently reaffirmed that the sale of an article that "substantially
embodies" the patent at issue triggers the patent exhaustion
doctrine.18 Specifically, the sale of an article whose only reasonable
and expected use includes practicing the patent exhausts the patent

&

Monsanto v. DuPont, PATENTLY-O BLOG (Aug. 11, 2012, 7:57 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/
(describing a
patent/2012/08/non-public-litigation-the-hidden-story-of-monsanto-v-dupont.html
$1 billion patent infringement judgment to Monsanto, despite not a single seed being sold).
11.
See Douglas Fretty, Note, Both a License and a Sale: How to Reconcile
Self-Replicating Technology with Patent Exhaustion, 5 J. BUS., ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 1, 2
(2011) ("Patent exhaustion, the rule that a patentee loses rights in a patent-practicing good upon
its authorized sale to a consumer, is tormented by uncertainty when the good can selfreplicate.").
12.
See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942); Adams v. Burke, 84
U.S. 453, 455 (1873).
See Univis, 316 U.S. at 250; Adams, 84 U.S. at 455.
13.
See Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Monsanto Co. v.
14.
McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Monsanto Co. v. David, 516 F.3d 1009,
1014 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("David's real complaint seems to be that he should be able to save seed
from his harvest, regardless of Monsanto's patent.").
15.
Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S.
Ct. 420 (2012); see generally supra note 10 (listing several lawsuits involving Monsanto and seed
patents).
See Noonan, supra note 10.Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.
16.
17.
See Tod Michael Leaven, Note, The Misinterpretation of the Patent Exhaustion
Doctrine and the Transgenic Seed Industry in Light of Quanta v. LG Electronics, 10 N.C. J.L.
TECH. 119, 122 (2008) (suggesting that Quanta's ruling removes "uniform patent law remedies for
enforcement of post-sale restrictions").
18.
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008).
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holder's rights to restrict that use. 19 The Court's holding in Quanta
notwithstanding, when faced with a similar seed case in Monsanto Co.
v. Bowman, the Federal Circuit relied primarily on its pre-Quanta
precedent and again found for the agribusiness. 20 The case now finds
itself before the Supreme Court to reconcile the competing case law. 2 1
Part I of this Note describes the nature of self-replicating
technology and discusses the characteristics of Monsanto's seed
patents that are relevant to patent exhaustion. Part II explains the
doctrine of patent exhaustion and expounds upon Monsanto's
pre-Quanta seed cases, which encourage a bright-line rule for
nth-generation patent protection, 22 and the Quanta case, which
suggests a more robust patent exhaustion doctrine. 23
Part III
discusses the Bowman case and examines the underlying facts and
rationale for the Federal Circuit's ruling.2 4 Part IV first analyzes the
Federal Circuit's opinion and the separability of patent rights and
then considers importing solutions and rationales from copyright law's
more mature legal structures governing incidental copies and
self-replication. Part V contends that relying on contract law in lieu of
patent rights ultimately fails to address the issue and that only
explicit licenses are capable of authorizing the reproduction of
self-replicating technology. Part VI concludes that explicit licenses to
make self-replicating technology provide the optimal balance of
equities, and only the patent holders have the right to grant such a
license.
I. SELF-REPLICATING TECHNOLOGY: THE NEW FRONTIER
Self-replicating technology-in the form of selective breeding
and cross-pollination-has been part of agriculture for centuries. 25
19.
Id. at 618, 631.
20.
Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1349.
21.
Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 420 (2012).
22.
See Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1347 ("Monsanto argues that, even if there was
exhaustion with respect to commodity seeds, Bowman is nevertheless liable for infringement by
planting those seeds because patent protection 'is independently applicable to each generation of
soybeans (or other crops) that contains the patented trait."'); see also Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs,
459 F.3d 1328, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1299 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
23.
See Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1346 ("Bowman urges the court to hold, under Quanta,
that each seed sold is a 'substantial embodiment' of all later generations, thus adopting a 'robust'
exhaustion doctrine that encompasses the progeny of seeds and other self-replicating
biotechnologies." (citation omitted)).
24.
Id. at 1348 (explaining that growing the next generation of seeds produces "newly
infringing article[s]").
25.
See Loren H. Rieseberg & Shanna E. Carney, Tansley Review No. 102 Plant
Hybridization, 140 NEW PHYTOLOGIST 599, 600 (1998) ("Hybridization has been important to
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Yet only recently have scientists moved beyond products of nature and
into the realm of man-made inventions. 26 Modern technology and
advances in genetics have allowed scientists to create fusions not
possible in the natural world, including plants and animals better
tailored to the needs of our society. 27 Once established, these specially
tailored beneficial traits will pass on and multiply with each
successive generation. 28
The complications of such exponential
dissemination have placed the simple seed, a self-replicating
technology that is millennia old, at the forefront of the patent
exhaustion debate. 29
A. Monsanto Roundup Ready Soy Beans
The introduction of sexually reproducing plants as patentable
subject matter led to a flood of plant patents, including Monsanto's
own Roundup Ready soybeans. 30 The seeds' development centered on
a resistance to Roundup and other glysophate-based herbicides. 31 The
seeds include two primary patents-the '605 Patent for "chimeric
genes for transforming plant cells using viral promoters" and the
'274E Patent that uses the viral promoters described in the '605
Patent to encode the gene sequence with a glyphosate-tolerant
enzyme. 32 These genetic traits allow farmers who use Monsanto's
seeds to treat their fields with Monsanto's Roundup herbicide without

humans since the Neolithic era when the domestication and breeding of plants and animals
began." (citing C. ZIRKLE, THE BEGINNINGS OF PLANT HYBRIDIZATION (1935)).

26.

See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 303 (1980).

27.

See PAUL F. LURQUIN, THE GREEN PHOENIX: A HISTORY OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED

PLANTS 1 (2001) ("Transgenic plants have been a reality since 1983."); FELICIA WU & WILLIAM P.
BUTZ, THE FUTURE OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS: LESSONS FROM THE GREEN REVOLUTION

41-42 (2004) (listing benefits such as herbicide and pesticide resistance, as well as "changing the
[crop's] fat and acid composition . . . , conferring resistance to viral infection . . . , and delaying

time to ripeness to allow for longer transportation time and shelf life").
28.
See Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1345 ("[Tlhe patented Roundup Ready genetic trait carries
forward into each successive seed generation.").
29.
See id. at 1343 (stating plaintiffs argument "that Monsanto's patent rights are
exhausted with respect to all Roundup Ready soybean seeds").
Id. at 1343 ("The '605 and '247E Patents cover different aspects of this Roundup
30.
Ready technology."); see J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 138,
145 (2001) (holding sexually reproduced plants fall within the patentable subject matter of
§ 101); ETC Grp., Surge in Corporate Patents on "Climate-Ready" Crops Threaten Biodiversity
and Signal Grab on Land and Biomass, ETC GROUP (Oct. 25, 2010), http://www.etcgroup.org/
sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/publication/pdf file/ETCClimatereadyNR251010final.pdf
(identifying "over 262 patent families, subsuming 1663 patent documents published worldwide
(both applications and issued patents) that make specific claims on environmental stress
tolerance in plants").
Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1343.
31.
Id. at 1343-44.
32.

2013]

BOWMAN'S BEANSTALK

955

harming their crop.3 3 Monsanto's genetically modified seeds now
account for approximately 93 percent of soybeans sold in the United
States. 34
Unlike other genetically modified crops, the traits in
Monsanto's soybeans are "true to seed," meaning that the patented
genetic material transfers to each successive generation of seeds. 35 A
Monsanto soybean plant yields an average of 85.8 new seeds, each
capable of creating another fertile plant with minimal effort. 36 To
protect its technology, Monsanto requires farmers to sign a technology
agreement upon each purchase of the soybeans. 37 The contract
restricts the farmers from using the seeds for more than a single
season and requires them to refrain both from selling leftovers from
the first planting and saving the grown seeds either for replanting or
for use in research. 38 Growers may sell their crops to local grain
elevators without restriction as commodity seed.3 9
B. Software, Quines, and Self-Replicating Programs
In addition to permitting advances in biotechnology, the advent
of computers has allowed for virtual concepts and mathematical
theories to become useful, functioning tools. 4 0
Self-replicating
Id. at 1344.
33.
34.
Peter Whoriskey, Monsanto's Dominance Draws Antitrust Inquiry, WASH. POST
(Nov. 29, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/28/AR200911280
2471.html.
35.
Tom Laskawy, Seeding Justice: Monsanto vs. Soybean Farmer Case Hits the
Supreme Court, GRIST (Oct. 10, 2012, 7:22 AM), http://grist.org/food/seeding-justice-monsanto-vssoybean-farmer-case-hits-the-supreme-court; Samantha M. Ohlgart, Note, The Terminator Gene:
Intellectual Property Rights vs. the Farmers'Common Law Right to Save Seed, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC.
L. 473, 476 (2002) (discussing terminator genes in genetically modified plants, which produce
"self-terminating offspring").
See More Beans Per Pod, supra note 4.
36.
Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1344.
37.
38.
The Federal Circuit explained:
Under the Technology Agreement, the licensed grower agrees: (1) "to use the seed
containing Monsanto gene technologies for planting a commercial crop only in a single
season"; (2) "to not supply any of this seed to any other person or entity for planting";
(3) "to not save any crop produced from this seed for replanting, or supply saved seed
to anyone for replanting"; and (4) "to not use this seed or provide it to anyone for crop
breeding, research, generation of herbicide registration data, or seed production."
Id. at 1344-45 (citation omitted).
39.
Id. at 1345. "Commodity seeds are a mixture of undifferentiated seeds harvested
from various sources" that are sold for different uses, such as feed or planting, without
restrictions. Deniza Gertsberg, Monsanto Wins Against Indiana Farmerover Seed Saving, GMO
J. (Sept. 26, 2011), http://gmo-journal.com/2011/09/26/monsanto-wins-against-indiana-farmerover-seed-saving.
40.
See, e.g., Michael S. Mahoney, The Structures of Computation and the Mathematical
Structure of Nature, RUTHERFORD J., http://www.rutherfordjournal.org/article03OlO7.html (last
visited Jan. 30, 2013) ("[T]heoretical computer science gave meaning to the seemingly
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programs, sometimes known as "quines," are increasingly common.
Their uses include network load balancing, dissemination of
applications across enterprise networks, peer-to-peer networking
tools, and even computer anti-virus tools. 41 Each system faces unique

issues regarding the self-replication process, such as how to set
implementation boundaries without prior knowledge of the number of
copies needed and the danger of any nth generation copy being
removed from the network, carrying with it the entire patented
technology. 42
Due to the ease of reproduction and inherent need for at least
limited reproduction rights, software often finds protection under
licensing agreements and contract law rather than outright sales. 43 A
typical software license grants the licensee permission to place copies
of the computer code on multiple machines and create the necessary
copy for whichever machine the licensee is using. 4 4 Corporations with
large numbers of employees often purchase bulk licenses. 45 The
licenses are subject to contract law and may be revoked upon a breach,

paradoxical notion of 'applied abstract algebra,' as it brought the most advanced concepts of
twentieth-century mathematics to bear on what has become the defining technology of our
time.").
A Honeypot Host, WO Patent No. 2010030169, EP Patent App. No. 2327014 (filed
41.
Sept. 11, 2009); Attenuated Computer Virus Vaccine, U.S. Patent No. 7,512,809 (filed Aug. 21,
2004) (issued Mar. 31, 2009); Automatic Network Load Balancing Using Self-Replicating Res.,
U.S. Patent App. No. 20030167295 (filed Mar. 1, 2002); Data Transfer to Nodes of a Commc'n
Network Using Self-Replicating Code, U.S. Patent No. 7,474,656 (filed Feb. 25, 2004) (issued
Jan. 6, 2009); see Self-Replicating and Self-Installing Software Apparatus, U.S. Patent App. No.
20030217171 (filed May 17, 2003); Self Replicating Installation Method for Operating Sys.
Clusters, U.S. Patent No. 7,240,107 (filed Oct. 15, 2002) (issued July 3, 2007).
For example, a network load balancing system is installed only once, after which it
42.
creates, removes, and recreates multiple instances as the system demands require. See infra
notes 50-51 and accompanying text. At the time of installation, the number of copies that will be
in existence at any given time cannot be known. See infra note 50. Similarly, the honeypot
system attracts hackers, then, once infiltrated, creates a new trap to lure its next victim. See
supra note 41. The user cannot know how many people, if any, will fall prey to the system. See
id.
See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software
43.
Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 34 (2001) ("[S]oftware vendors have taken the position that all
software is licensed rather than sold.").
See Dena Chen et al., Providing an Incidental Copies Exemption for Service
44.
Providers and End-Users, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE 3 (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.publicknowledge.
org/files/docs/craincidentalcopies.pdf ("Similarly, all software programs create incidental copies
as a fundamental part of their RAM-based operations, and make other kinds of temporary files
to maximize program efficiency, preserve RAM memory, and the like.").
See, e.g., End User License Agreement, ADOBE, § 16.6.2, http://www.adobe.com/
45.
products/eula/tools/captivate.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) (stating one copy of the font
software is allowed in the RAM of a machine per five machines).
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such as exceeding the number of intended users. 46 Most importantly,
neither the individual nor the corporate purchaser owns the software
product. 47 This simple fact precludes the invocation of patent
exhaustion for the vast majority of software scenarios, since the
licensee lacks the authorization to sell the article as required by the
doctrine. 48
Problems arise, however, when the software owner sells rather
than licenses the software or when the specific origin of the article is
unknown. 49 Running software often creates incidental copies of the
software in a machine's random access memory (RAM). 50 Incidental
copies are also necessary whenever software travels through a
network and across intermediate servers.5 1 The software owner has
the right to use the software, but it is unclear whether the temporary
copies that are incidental to its use are also authorized. 52 In other
words, if the consumer has obtained those rights through a purchase
from the patent holder, it remains uncertain if the consumer can then
pass those rights to another when reselling the product. 53

46.
See, e.g., Adobe Volume Licensing/Business/Enterprise Agreement, ADOBE,
http://www.adobe.com/volume-licensing/business/enterprise-agreement.html (last visited Jan. 30,
2013) (requiring a minimum purchase of one hundred licenses and a three-year agreement).
47.
See Chen et al., supra note 44, at 9 ("[S]oftware licenses ...
give consumers only
possession, and not 'ownership,' of the software.").
48.
See Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Elecs., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208, 213
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) ("Entering a license agreement is not a 'sale' for purposes of the first sale
doctrine." (citing ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310, 1331 (N.D. Ill.
1990))).
49.
See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1116 (9th Cir. 2010) (reversing the
district court's decision that Vernor, who had purchased software from a garage sale, was
entitled to protection under the first sale doctrine).
50.
This has been the subject of considerable copyright litigation. Most courts now hold
that a temporary copy loaded in the RAM memory of a computer is "fixed" and therefore
constitutes a new copy for copyright purposes. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.,
991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993). Many critics, however, disagree with this view. See Mark A.
Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 547, 551-52
& n.25 (1997) (cataloguing the critiques of MAI). An analogous conclusion seems evident in
patent law. Because patent law has no fixation requirement, any reproduction of a patented
program, no matter how temporary, arguably constitutes a "making" within the meaning of the
statute.

51.
See Lemley, supra note 50, at 555-56 (comparing liability for RAM copies to copies
created on network intermediaries).
52.
See id.
53.
See id. at 575 (explaining how overlapping copyrights in the digital world have
"altered the balance of rights set by Congress").
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II. PERSPECTIVES ON PATENT EXHAUSTION

While the doctrine of patent exhaustion has existed since the
early nineteenth century, 54 it has recently undergone a resurgence as
an affirmative defense to patent infringement. 55 The doctrine, while
initially considered a "straight-forward proposition,"5 6 became
muddled in the twentieth century with the introduction of new
technologies.5 7 A trio of cases over the previous decade seemed to
narrow the doctrine to exclude self-replicating technology until the
Supreme Court ruling in Quanta breathed new life into the rule.5 8
A. Patent Exhaustion
The Federal Patent Act grants patent holders the "exclusive
right to make, use, and vend [their] invention or discovery." 59 These
rights may be transferred in whole by the sale of the patent or in part
by the sale of an article embodying the patent.6 0
The patent
exhaustion doctrine, which is based in common law, 61 states that, after
an authorized sale of a patented article, the purchaser is free to use or
resell that article without restraint from patent law. 62 The doctrine
rests on two balancing rationales: the patent holder benefits from the
right to the exclusive "first" distribution and its accompanying
compensation, and the public benefits from avoiding hidden licensing
fees on the later use or sale. 63 Additionally, the public benefits from a
robust and open secondary market that is strengthened by consumer
54.
Vincent Chiappetta, Patent Exhaustion: What's It Good for?, 51 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1087, 1087-88 (2011) ('The Supreme Court created the patent exhaustion doctrine in the
nineteenth century.").
55.
John W. Osborne, A Coherent View of Patent Exhaustion: A Standard Based on
PatentableDistinctiveness, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 643, 646 (2004).
56.
See Chiappetta, supra note 54, at 1088.
57.
See Osborne, supra note 55, at 646 ("As a result, patentees and would-be
licensees/infringers must contend with strained interpretations of seemingly conflicting
caselaw.").
58.
See Noonan, supra note 10 (referencing the McFarling, Scruggs, and David cases).
Compare supra note 22 (explaining that past cases considered each subsequent generation of
self-replicating technology to be a new article outside of the initial sale), with Monsanto Co. v.
Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 420 (2012) (suggesting
that Quanta supports a robust patent exhaustion doctrine that would include the progeny of selfreplicating technologies).
59.
United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942); see also 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a) (2006).
60.
See Osborne, supra note 55, at 648.
61.
See Chiappetta, supra note 54, at 1088 n.3 (noting that the exhaustion doctrine has
never been codified in federal patent law).
62.
Adams v. Burke. 84 U.S. 453, 455 (1873).
63.
Osborne, supra note 55, at 658.
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confidence in the ability to resell the used article.6 4 Without the
doctrine, a patent holder could control the disposition of the patented
goods indefinitely and could collect multiple royalties for each
subsequent resell. 65 Thus, the doctrine limits the patent holder to one
"bite of the apple" per sale and provides incentive to price the initial
But patent holders trying to control their
sale accordingly. 6 6
inventions often undermine the doctrine by utilizing licenses to control
or restrict the downstream use of their products.6 7
B. Monsanto's Legal Victories
Monsanto's limitations on the future use of its patented
soybeans quickly collided with the traditional agricultural practice of
saving seed for next year's planting. 68 Time and again, those
disagreeing with Monsanto's restrictions have tested the validity and
reach of its patent rights. 69
Regardless of the angle of
attack-whether it was deliberate breach of the agreement,
purchasing without signing the agreement, or denying the act
altogether-the court has steadfastly held for Monsanto. 70
1. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling
One of the first pre-Quanta seed cases involved a Mississippi
farmer, Homan McFarling, who purchased Roundup Ready soybeans,
64.
Chiappetta, supra note 54, at 1136 (arguing that patent exhaustion
"improve[s] ... the secondary aftermarket, reducing prices, increasing access, and limiting
deadweight loss").
65.
William A. Birdwell, Exhaustion of Rights and Patent Licensing Market Restrictions,
60 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 203, 216, 229 (1978).
66.
See Chiappetta, supra note 54, at 1094 ("When a patent owner sells a patented
article, reasonable parties will normally assume . . . that the owner has demanded and received

full compensation under the patent."). Presumably, the initial sale provides "adequate financial
reward to stimulate invention." Birdwell, supra note 65, at 216, 229.
67.
See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert.
granted, 133 S. Ct. 420 (2012).
68.
See Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1344-45 (detailing the restrictions imposed by Monsanto's
technology agreement); WU & BUTZ, supra note 27, at 52 (suggesting that industrial nations are
more comfortable with buying seeds each season and are moving away from the more traditional
methods of saving seeds).
69.
See Noonan, supra note 10 (discussing several suits involving farmers who saved
seeds).
70.
See Monsanto Co. v. David, 516 F.3d 1009, 1012-13 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (rejecting the
farmer's arguments that no seeds were saved, in part due to the farmer's inability to explain his
fully planted fields with the inadequate amount of seeds he purchased that year); Monsanto Co.
v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling (McFarling1), 302
F.3d 1291, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("McFarling does not dispute that he violated the terms of the
Technology Agreement. He . . . stated that unless enjoined he intended to [continue saving
seeds]."); Noonan, supra note 10.
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signed the Monsanto technology agreement, and then deliberately
breached it by saving a portion of his harvest each year for planting
during the next season. 7' The parties argued the case before the
McFarling conceded that he was in
Federal Circuit in 2002.72
violation of the agreement but contended that the restriction violated
the doctrine of patent exhaustion. 73 McFarling relied on the Univis
Lens case, which held that an "authorized sale of an article which is
capable of use only in practicing the patent is a relinquishment of the
patent monopoly with respect to the article sold." 74 But the Federal
Circuit disagreed based on the contention that the new seeds were not
the subject of a sale of any kind and so could not fit within the
"first-sale" doctrine.7 5 Furthermore, Monsanto sold the initial seeds
only for a single use and did not confer a license to construct new
seeds.7 6 The Supreme Court denied the case's subsequent petition for
certiorari.77
2. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs
In 2006, a similar case again reached the Federal Circuit
involving another Mississippi farmer by the name of Mitchell
Scruggs.7 8 Scruggs purchased both Roundup Ready soybeans and
cotton seeds without ever signing a technology agreement.7 9 The
grower argued that he had purchased the articles in an unrestricted
sale and should have the right to their use under the doctrine of
patent exhaustion.8 0 The court used the same reasoning as in
McFarling, saying that the second-generation seeds had never been
sold and could not trigger the "first sale" doctrine.8 ' The court also
explained that a capability of replication did not include a right to use
the replicated works and that to do so would "eviscerate the rights of
the patent holder." 8 2 The Supreme Court denied Scruggs's petition for

certiorari. 83
71.
See McFarling1, 302 F.3d at 1293.
72.
Id. at 1291.
73.
Id. at 1298-99.
Id. at 1291 (quoting United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942)).
74.
75.
See id. at 1299.
76.
See id.
77.
McFarling v. Monsanto Co. (McFarlingII), 537 U.S. 1232 (2003).
Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
78.
79.
Id. at 1333.
80.
Id. at 1335-36.
Id. at 1336.
81.
Id. ("The fact that a patented technology can replicate itself does not give a
82.
purchaser the right to use replicated copies of the technology.").
Scruggs v. Monsanto Co., 549 U.S. 1342, 1342 (2007).
83.
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3. Monsanto Co. v. David
Two years after Scruggs, Loren David, a farmer operating in
North and South Dakota, found himself before the Federal Circuit for
improperly using Monsanto's soybeans. 84 Monsanto suspected David
of saving seeds from previous plantings after it determined that his
entire fields contained Roundup Ready soybeans, despite David not
purchasing an adequate amount of new seed that season to plant on
all of the plots.8

5

The Federal Circuit followed its precedent in

McFarling and reiterated that no right exists to save seeds under the
patent system and that patent exhaustion is not implicated for articles
that did not undergo an authorized sale. 8 6 The court ruled in favor of
Monsanto, due in large part to the lack of credibility concerning
David's inconsistent and continually changing testimony.87
C. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.
Just as the Federal Circuit was building a body of case law
around the topic of patent exhaustion in self-replicating technologies,
the Supreme Court reintroduced uncertainty with its ruling in
Quanta.8 8
The case began with LG licensing a number of patents to Intel
that involved controlling memory and data between various
One patent-the '641
components of a computer system.8 9
Patent-addressed the issue of synchronizing data changes between
'379
main
memory. 90
Another-the
the
cache
and
Patent-coordinated read and write requests to the main memory. 9 1
Finally, the '733 Patent managed the traffic on the computer bus to
avoid over-monopolization. 92 The licensing agreement allowed Intel to
manufacture and sell chipsets that used these patents but restricted
third parties from combining the licensed Intel product with any
non-Intel product. 93

Monsanto Co. v. David, 516 F.3d 1009, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
84.
Id.
85.
Id. at 1014.
86.
87.
Id. at 1015.
See Chiappetta, supranote 54, at 1088.
88.
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 621, 623 (2008).
89.
Id. at 622.
90.
Id.
91.
92.
Id. at 621-22 ("A set of wires, or bus, connects the microprocessor to a chipset,
which transfers data between the microprocessor and other devices, including the keyboard,
mouse, monitor, hard drive, memory, and disk drives.").
Id. at 623.
93.
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Quanta, while aware of the restrictions on the Intel chipsets,
incorporated its own products with Intel's in ways that practiced LG's
patents. 94 When LG sued to enjoin the activity, Quanta claimed that
the sale of the patented chipsets exhausted any right LG maintained
over their use.9 5 LG argued patent exhaustion was inapplicable to
method patentS 96 since they must be practiced each time the article is
used, even after a sale.97 In contrast, Quanta contended that the
Court should refrain from excluding method claims from patent
exhaustion, as it would allow patentees to avoid exhaustion altogether
by rewording their patent claims.9 8 The Court agreed with Quanta. 99
The Court then turned to the precedent established in Univis
Lens in determining whether selling an incomplete article that
requires another act or combination may exhaust the patent.1 0 0
Univis Lens involved the sale of unpatented, unfinished lens blanks to
a third-party manufacturer. 10 1 The manufacturer would then grind
the lenses to create the patented, finished product and distribute them
for sale. 102 The Court in Univis Lens held that the sale of an
unfinished article with a single reasonable and intended use-to be
ground and finished-would exhaust the patent holder's right to
control the use or sale of that particular article. 103
The Supreme Court found that Intel designed the chipsets to
control data and memory between components and "substantially
embodied" the patents at issue. 104 Attaching the chipset to the
necessary parts was the only reasonable use for the product and did
not add any inventive thought that would preclude exhaustion.10 5 The
ruling revived the "substantial embodiment" test and signaled the

94.
Id. at 624.
95.
Id.
96.
Method patents, also known as process patents, claim a series of steps or actions
that are used to produce a specific result, such as innovative methods for curing rubber or
tempering steel. E.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972) ("A process is a mode of
treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts,
performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing."
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1876))).
97.
Quanta, 553 U.S. at 628.
Id.
98.
99.
Id. at 630.
Id. at 630-31.
100.
United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 243-44 (1942).
101.
102.
Id. at 244.
Id. at 249.
103.
Quanta, 553 U.S. at 633 ("[TLhe incomplete article substantially embodies the
104.
patent because the only step necessary to practice the patent is the application of common
processes or the addition of standard parts.").
105.
Id. at 633-34.
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desire for a stronger exhaustion doctrine.1 06
Many scholars
immediately made the leap to the singular purpose of seeds and
predicted the coming end of patent rights in second-generation
seeds. 107
III. BOWMAN'S BEANSTALK

Despite the setbacks of earlier cases, the ruling in Quanta
emboldened Vernon Bowman, an Indiana farmer, to challenge
Monsanto's patent rights.10 8
In an effort to circumvent the
technology-licensing agreement and associated fees, Bowman chose to
purchase seeds on the open market, test them for Monsanto's patented
traits, and keep the valuable seeds for replanting.10 9 Both the district
court and the Federal Circuit rejected Bowman's argument that
absent the express limitations imposed by the licensing agreement the
owner of the seeds had the freedom to use them for their primary
purpose-planting. 110
A. Background
Bowman lost in both the district court and the Federal Circuit,
but he now stands ready to plead his case before the Supreme
Court.11 1 Bowman's story arguably demands more sympathy than
that of his predecessors. 1 12 Bowman purchased a fresh batch of
Roundup Ready seed each year for the first planting of the season. 113

106.
Id. at 637 ("[N]o further 'making' results from the addition of standard parts ... to a
product that already substantially embodies the patent.").
107.
See, e.g., Yuichi Watanabe, The Doctrine of Patent Exhaustion: The Impact of
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 273 (2009); Jon Sievers, Note, Not
So Fast My Friend: What the Patent Exhaustion Doctrine Means to the Seed Industry After
Quanta v. LG Electronics, 14 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 355, 372 (2009).
108.
See Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert.
granted, 133 S. Ct. 420 (2012).
109.
See id.
110.
See Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1347-48; Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d 834,
839 (S.D. Ind. 2009), aff'd, 657 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 420 (2012).
111.
Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 420.
112.
Each of the three previous cases involved questionable acts on the part of the
farmers: McFarling breached his contract in bad faith, see supra Part II.B. 1; Scruggs did not sign
the contract, see supra Part II.B.2; and David attempted to claim he planted his fields with seeds
that were likely purchased a month after the fact, see supra Part II.B.3. Bowman, by comparison,
signed the technology agreement and abided by it in full. See Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1345-46. He
purchased seeds that Monsanto had explicitly allowed to be sold to the granary without further
restrictions on future sales. See id. His hands are arguably cleaner than any of his predecessors.
113.
Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1345.
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Upon harvest, he abided by the technology agreement and sold every
seed, keeping none for future plantings. 114
But Bowman wished to get the most from his land and wanted
to cultivate a second crop at the tail end of the season.1 15 Because of
the additional risk inherent in the shorter time frame coupled with
declining growing conditions, Bowman sought to minimize potential
losses. 116 Instead of purchasing a second batch of Roundup Ready
seed-which was prohibitively expensive-Bowman
purchased
unrestricted commodity seed from a local granary.11 7
During each planting, Bowman tested the crop for the same
Roundup Ready properties as those purchased from Monsanto. 118
Believing the unrestricted sale allowed him to utilize the seed as he
saw fit, Bowman began saving the patented seed from this second crop
for replanting each year.1 19 Bowman, confident that his use was
noninfringing, notified Monsanto of his activities. 120
Monsanto
sued.121
B. Federal Circuit Opinion
At the Federal Circuit, Bowman argued that the seeds
substantially embodied the patents at issue and that limiting the
singular use of the seed rendered the doctrine of patent exhaustion
useless for self-replicating technologies. 12 2 Bowman argued that the
Supreme Court in Quanta had disapproved of unnecessarily limiting
the exhaustion doctrine in regards to method patents and that the
Federal Circuit should refrain from arbitrarily eliminating the
doctrine for self-replicating technologies. 1 23
Monsanto countered, citing favorable rulings from the previous
line of seed cases. 124 Monsanto argued that the progeny of the
114.
Id.
115.
See id.
116.
See id. (explaining that the purchase was to reduce costs).
117.
Id. Because of the restriction requiring the crop be used only for sale to local
granaries and the pervasive use of Monsanto's seeds, the granaries' supply often consisted
primarily of patented seeds. See id. (stating that 94 percent of soybeans grown in the area were
herbicide resistant strains). The granaries have no duty to keep the patented seeds separate
from the unpatented ones. Both types are sold as general-use commodity seeds without any
licensing agreements. Without further testing (which Bowman performed), the two seeds would
appear identical to the buyer. See id. at 1346.
118.
Id. at 1346.
119.
Id.
120.
Id.
121.
Id.
122.
See id.
123.
See id.
124.
See id. at 1347.
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patented seeds were new infringing articles and that the patent
protection "is independently applicable to each generation of soybeans
(or other crops) that contains that patented trait."1 2 5 Monsanto
further contended that Bowman's reading of the exhaustion doctrine
would effectively eliminate patent protection for self-replicating
technology. 126 Under Monsanto's reasoning, a single seed could
furnish a farmer (or farmers) with an inexhaustible supply of
genetically altered products. 127
The Federal Circuit found that patent exhaustion did not
prevent a finding of infringement in either McFarling or Scruggs, and
it would not do so for Bowman.1 28 The court in Bowman relied heavily
on its pre-Quanta seed cases and failed to add a great deal of new
analysis. 129 The court held the purchase of the commodity seed was
valid, but the act of planting the seed and the resulting crop
constituted infringement.1 3 0 The right to use does not include the
right to copy a protected article. 131 The court's view that "[a]pplying
the first sale doctrine to subsequent generations .

.

. would eviscerate

the rights of the patent holder," while logical, was unsupported by
analysis specific to self-replicating technologies.1 3 2
In a nod to Quanta, the court also addressed the notion of a
single use for the commodity seed, pointing out that the seed had
other potential uses, such as feed. 133 Under Quanta, if the seed is
"without utility" except in practicing the patent, then patent
exhaustion applies.1 34 The court found that alternative uses for the
soybeans existed, but it implied that additional facts showing that
planting was the "only reasonable and intended use" for the
commodity seeds may have satisfied Quanta'ssubstantial embodiment
test.1 35 While this approach would continue to protect dual-purpose

125.
See id. (citation omitted).
126.
See id.
127.
Without patent exhaustion, for the cost of a single seed, farmers can produce a
never-ending supply of enhanced seeds. See id. at 1345.
128.
Id. at 1347-48.
129.
See id.
130.
See id. at 1348.
131.
See id.
132.
Id. (citing Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Patent
rights are intended to encourage innovation and progress in the sciences. See U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8. The court did not analyze why upholding the exclusivity of the patent would align with
this policy, implying that merely holding and exercising a patent right benefits progress. See
Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1347-48.
133.
See Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1348.
134.
United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1942).
135.
Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1348 (citing Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553
U.S. 617, 631 (2008)).
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crops, the fate of other crops with less versatile seeds-apples, for
instance-remains less certain. 136 Synthetic alterations to DNA
sequences and engineered organisms will rarely have secondary uses
outside the problem that instigated their creation. 137 To require
alternative uses in order to benefit fully from the patent system would
seem to contradict or at least raise the minimal utility requirements
prerequisite to obtaining a patent. 138
Bowman appealed the Federal Circuit's decision in favor of
Monsanto. To the surprise of some and delight of others, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 139
IV. THE RIGHT TO MAKE, INCIDENTAL COPYING, AND THE LIMITS OF
PATENT LAW

At the heart of the confusion lies a scenario unique to
self-replicating technology-when using the article also involves
making the article.1 40 The doctrine of patent exhaustion, which
permits the unrestricted use but not the reproduction of the article,
now finds itself in uncharted waters. 141 Are the two rights so
intertwined that the exhaustion of one automatically exhausts the
other? Or if separable, do other considerations exist that would
support the application of patent exhaustion when the use of a
patented article creates copies of that article?

136.
Soybeans are relatively versatile in that the seed may be used for planting, feed, or
other uses. See Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1348. Other seeds (e.g., apple seeds) are not useful for feed
and are useful only in planting. Under this logic, seeds that are useful for either planting or
eating (e.g., soybeans, corn, wheat) are not exhausted while other equally useful genetic crops
may find themselves without this protection. See U.S. Technology Use Guide, supra note 7, at 1
(listing a variety of Monsanto's genetically enhanced crops, including cotton, corn, and soybeans).
137.
See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980) (concerning an
organism specifically created to aid in oil-spill cleanups by consuming the crude).
138.
See Sean B. Seymore, Patently Impossible, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1491, 1502-03 & n.57
(2011) (explaining the PTO's difficulty in establishing unpatentability from lack of utility).
139.
Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 420 (2012); Kevin E. Noonan, Solicitor General
Recommends the Supreme Court Deny Cert in Bowman v. Monsanto, PATENT DOCS (Aug. 30,
2012, 11:59 PM), http://www.patentdoes.org/2012/08/solicitor-general-recommends-the-supremecourt-deny-cert-in-bowman-v-monsanto.html; Tanya Sitton, Supreme Court to Hear Monsanto
Patent Case: Can Farmers Reclaim Rights to Save Seed?, EAT DRINK BETTER (Oct. 12, 2012),
http://eatdrinkbetter.com/2012/10/12/supreme-court-to-hear-monsanto-patent-case-can-farmersreclaim-rights-to-save-seed.
140.
See Jeremy N. Sheff, Self-Replicating Technologies, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 229, 238
(2013) ("[T[he only and intended 'use' of seeds or any other self-replicating technology necessarily
'makes' a newly infringing article.").
141.
See Chiappetta, supra note 54, at 1097 (suggesting that complications arise when it
comes to "determining if and when ... changes move beyond the 'use' authorized by exhaustion,
and instead become an impermissible 'making' of a new article").
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Due to the similarities between seeds and software,1 42 and the
latter's status as a relatively more mature field of study, an
examination of the intellectual property laws governing computer code
can provide guidelines for protecting rights holders while incentivizing
innovation and protecting consumers. 14 3 Copyright law has wrangled
with the wholesale copying of programs for decades.1 44 Statutory
permissions, explicit licenses, and the fair use doctrine serve as
possible protective measures for the industry.' 4 5 An analysis of the
development and underlying rationales of these carve-outs can help
inform analogous issues in patent law.
A. The Right to Make
The Federal Circuit's ruling in Bowman correctly emphasizes
the separability of patent rights and the limited application of
exhaustion.1 4 6 The patent holder has a monopoly over the right to
make, use, and sell his inventions and can assign or exhaust each
right independently of the others. 147 While an unrestricted sale
exhausts the patent holder's control over the use or resale of that
particular article, it does not grant the purchaser the right to make
the technology. 148 The right to make and exclude others from making
rests with the patent owner and is only exhausted upon the sale of the
patent itself.1 49 The right to exclude others from recreating the
142.
See supra Part I.A-B (explaining the self-replicating nature of seeds and software
and the tendency for incidental copies to be created). Plants cannot help but produce more seeds,
and computer programs cannot function without RAM copies. See supra Part I.A-B.
143.
Compare Cohen & Lemley, supra note 43, at 3 (claiming that "eighty thousand
software patents [have] already issued" in the United States), with ETC Grp., supra note 30
(identifying "1663 patent documents published worldwide" relating to "stress tolerance in plants"
(emphasis added)).
144.
See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667
(illustrating that Congress intended the amendments in the 1976 Copyright Act to expand "[t]he
term 'literary works"' so that "[i]t also includes computer data bases, and computer programs").
145.
See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2006) (listing specific acts of copying by the owner of a
computer program that do not constitute infringement); 17 U.S.C. § 107 (fair use); supra Part LB
(discussing explicit licenses).
146.
See Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("The right to
use 'do[es] not include the right to [make] . . . .' (quoting Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n,
264 F.3d 1094, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2001))), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 420 (2012).
147.
See Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 454 (1873) (showing that the patent owner may
not only assign the specific rights to make and sell the patented item, the owner may also limit
those rights to a geographic area); Osborne, supra note 55, at 648 ("The patentee may surrender
his monopoly in whole by the sale of his patent or in part by the sale of an article embodying the
invention." (emphasis added)).
148.
See Chiappetta, supra note 54, at 1097 ("When exhaustion applies, it only
extinguishes [the rights in] . .. the particular article. It does not 'exhaust' the patent right in its
entirety.").
149.
See Osborne, supra note 55, at 648.
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technology supersedes the exhaustion of the other rights, and patent
holders may still sue the creators of infringing copies.15 0 The Bowman
court found that purchasing an article with the ability to self-replicate
did not grant the purchaser that right by default, 15 1 particularly when
alternative uses were available. 152
The substantial embodiment rationale in Univis Lens and
Quanta is insufficient to support exhaustion of the right to make.1 53
The rule balances the restrictions placed on patent holders'
downstream rights by limiting the exemption to the use and resale of
the specific item sold. 154 Self-replicating technologies incorporate
every aspect of the patented technology,15 5 and their main, if not only,
purpose is to reproduce.15 6 Often, using these technologies creates
incidental copies. 15 7 Exhausting the right to make along with the
right to use would remove the limit on the consumer's right to produce
new articles without a reciprocal grant to the patent holder. 15 8 The

.

150.
See Chiappetta, supra note 54, at 1095 (stating that enforcing the right to make
regarding manufacturing licenses raises "policy concerns antecedent to the application of
exhaustion"); Cohen & Lemley, supra note 43, at 31 ("It is not the patent right itself that is
exhausted, of course. The patentee retains the rights to prevent anyone else, including the buyer,
from making, using, or selling additional copies of the patented item."); see also Jazz Photo Corp.,
264 F.3d at 1102 ("[R]ights of ownership do not include the right to construct [a] ... new article
151.
See Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted,
133 S. Ct. 420 (2012).
152.
See id. (suggesting that the seeds could be used as feed).
153.
Univis and Quanta did not involve self-replicating technologies; they addressed the
unfinished lenses for bifocals and method claims for controlling the flow of computer data,
respectively. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 622-23 (2008); United
States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 246-47 (1942). Any actions allowed to complete the
unfinished lens blank were limited to the particular item. See Univis, 316 U.S. at 249. Likewise,
although the method claims were practiced each time the computers were used, the scope of the
use remained limited to the particular item sold. See Quanta, 553 U.S. at 628-29. Neither
situation accounts for a scenario in which using the product at issue creates additional articles
outside of the scope of the product sold.
154.
See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 43, at 31.
155.
See, e.g., Laskawy, supra note 35.
See Sheff, supra note 140, at 238 ("[T]he only and intended 'use' of seeds or any
156.
other self-replicating technology necessarily 'makes' a newly infringing article.").
157.
See generally Part I.A-B (explaining that computer systems create copies of code in
RAM each time the software is loaded for use).
The price paid for a patented article is compensation for the unfettered right to use
158.
and resell that article. See Chiappetta, supra note 54, at 1094. Presumably, the price demanded
for the sale of a single item does not include compensation for an unlimited right to make new
articles. See id. If such were the case, a single seed would cost the equivalent of a hundred
bushels since both are capable of creating an unlimited supply of future seeds. See id.
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consumer would unfairly profit simply because of the technology's
unique nature.15 9 Such an inequitable grant is unnecessary. 16 0
B. Incidental Copying, Software, and Copyright Law
When reproduction and replication inherently occur with each
use of the invention, the situation requires clear delineations of
ownership and authorization. 16 1 The emergence of self-replicating
biotech and software patents are relatively new to patent law, and
only a handful of precedents are available to navigate the issues. 162
Copyright, on the other hand, has developed robust and mature case
law and legal structures to address the issue of wholesale copying. 163
In particular, technology-specific statutory exemptions, contracts and
licenses, and fair use exemptions address the incidental and
self-replicating nature of software. 164 Each area shares overlapping
policy considerations and all strive to strike the best balance between
protecting creativity and benefitting the consumer.
1. The Essential-Step Exemption
As early as 1980, Congress saw the need to address copyright
issues surrounding the incidental copies created when using software
programs. 165 Known colloquially as the "essential-step defense," the
statute allows the owner of a copy of software to create copies without
infringing so long as the copy acts as an essential step in the use of the
program, such as a RAM copy. 16 6 The right to utilize the work is
protected insofar as it does not infringe the copyright holder's right to

159.
Since the actual price of the article does not include adequate compensation for the
right to make unlimited replicas, it is questionable if the sale will provide "adequate financial
reward" for the inventor. See Birdwell, supra note 65, at 216, 229.
160.
See infra Part V (suggesting that maintaining strong patent protections offers the
best results).
161.
See Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining that
applying patent exhaustion to self-replicating technologies would "eviscerate" patent protection
for the industry (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006)), cert.
granted, 133 S. Ct. 420 (2012).
162.
See, e.g., Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1335-36 (using the limited number of available
precedents from previous seed cases to support the court's ruling).
163.
See generally supra Part 1V.B (detailing how the essential step defense, licenses,
and the fair use doctrine have developed in the copyright context).
164.
See 17 U.S.C. § 117(c) (2006) (technology-specific statutory exemptions); 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (fair use); supra Part I.B (contracts and licenses).
165.
An Act to Amend the Patent and Trademark Laws, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat.
3015 (1980) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 117 to allow for noninfringing incidental computer copies).
166.
17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1).
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distribute the work.167
Similar to the first sale doctrine, the
essential-step defense seeks to restrict the author's commercial
influence after the sale. 168 Unnecessary copies lie outside the
protection of the statute and still constitute infringing articles. 169
Courts apply the defense narrowly due largely to the pervasive
nature of licensing rather than selling in the software industry, 170
which prevents most possessors of software from establishing actual
ownership. 17 1 Consequently, most users' rights to install and use
software derive from specific terms in their licenses rather than from
the exceptions laid out in the federal statute. 172
2. Licenses
Software
licenses limit propagation
and allow the
inventor-owner to impose specific restrictions on the licensees. 173 As
noted above, the majority of software sales are actually licenses. 174
The scope of the license limits the ability to create copies, even those
necessary to utilize the product.1 75 Unless otherwise stated in the
license, the licensee has no authority to resell, replicate, or use the
product in violation of the license's terms.17 6
This demarcation establishes clear rules when operating with
self-replicating software. 177 The buyer has notice that the
167.
Rudolph Leska, Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010), 15 INTELL.
PROP. L. BULL. 99, 100 (2011), available at http://www.iplb.org/assets/pdfs/Volumel5/Surveys/
USFIPLB_15-1_LeskaSurvey.pdf ("[Tihe 'owner of a particular copy' enjoys the right to sell
that copy without infringing the distribution right of the copyright holder.").
168.
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (first sale doctrine); Leska, supra note 167, at 100 (drawing
similarities between the essential-step defense and the first sale doctrine because both require
an authorized sale).
169.
The essential-step defense only allows copies "created as an essential step in the use
of the program on a machine, and for no other purpose." Leska, supra note 167, at 100.
170.
Cohen & Lemley, supra note 43, at 34 ("[S]oftware vendors have taken the position
that all software is licensed rather than sold.").
171.
Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) ("[A software user is a
licensee rather than an owner of a copy where the copyright owner: (1) specifies that the user is
granted a license; (2) significantly restricts the user's ability to transfer the software; and (3)
imposes notable use restrictions.").
172.
See Autodesk, 621 F.3d at 1112 n.13.
173.
See, e.g., End User License Agreement, supra note 45, § 4.
174.
See Autodesk, 621 F.3d at 1111.
175.
See, e.g., End User License Agreement, supra note 45, § 16.6.2.
176.
See, e.g., id. § 4.61.
177.
The malleability of licenses allows for a plethora of variations to accommodate the
unique characteristics of self-replicating technology. See supra note 38 (detailing the restrictions
in Monsanto's technology agreement). Monsanto's attempt to permit only the first planting of its
seeds serves as a prime example. See id. That limited license to create replicas remains with the
first purchaser, even after the first purchaser has sold their seeds, similar to the end user license
in Vernor v. Autodesk. See Autodesk, 621 F.3d at 1112.
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inventor-owner
maintains
the
rights
in
the
product.17 8
Unsurprisingly, reproduction without use-such as copying the
product onto an independent disk-typically conflicts with the
license. 179 Replication through use, however, has defined boundaries
authorizing the program to promulgate only so far as the license
permits.18 0 Anything more is both a breach of the license and a
violation of the patent owner's right to exclude others from copying
and distributing the software. 18 1
3. Fair Use
Fair use, a common-law principle that Congress codified in

§ 107 of the Copyright Act, rests on the belief that the public has a
right to use copyrighted materials in certain ways without
infringing. 182 Criticism, commentary, transformative adaptations, and
even reverse engineering are among the excepted uses. 183 Fair use
serves as a "traditional safety [valve to] balance the public's interest"
in using limited amounts of the protected works and the copyright
owners' property interests. 184 A fair use analysis considers four
primary factors: (1) the purpose and character of the use, (2) the
nature of the work being copied, (3) the amount taken, and (4) its
effect on the original work's potential market.186
Private,
noncommercial uses generally have a greater likelihood of escaping
liability. 186

178.
See Michael L. Rustad & Diane D'Angelo, The Path of Internet Law: An Annotated
Guide to Legal Landmarks, 2011 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 12, 39 n.161; see e.g., End User License
Agreement, supra note 45, § 3.
179.
See, e.g., End User License Agreement, supra note 45, § 4.6.1.
180.
See, e.g., id. § 16.6.2.
181.
See Autodesk, 621 F.3d at 1112 ("Vernor's sales infringed Autodesk's exclusive right
to distribute copies of its work." (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006))).
182.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678
(giving "express statutory recognition [to fair use] for the first time" and noting that "there is
ample case law recognizing the existence of the doctrine and applying it").
183.
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (commentary); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
569 (1994) ("The more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other
factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use."); Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("[R]everse engineering object code to
discern the unprotectable ideas in a computer program is a fair use." (citing Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991))).
184.

NANCY KRANICH, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE INFORMATION COMMONS: A

PUBLIC POLICY REPORT 7 (2004), available at http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/Information
Commons.pdf.
185.
Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 576-77.
186.
See id. at 585 ("[T]he fact that a publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit
is a separate factor that tends to weigh against a finding of fair use." (quoting Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985))).
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Software rarely finds protection under this defense.18 7 The
complexity of code coupled with the desire to preserve utilitarian
aspects of the product typically results in exact copies. 188 Additionally,
the readily available market allows an unauthorized copy to amount
to a lost sale. 189 Despite the limitations of the defense, the ease of
copying and ready market for the illicit copies lead software
manufacturers to avoid the application of fair use entirely if possible.
Hence, licenses-which are not authorized sales-continue to be
copyright's most useful paradigm for protecting self-replicating
software.
C. The Limits of Patent Law
Both patent and copyright exist in the same legal realm, but
the rationales underpinning each framework differ, leading to
overlapping but not congruent protections. Because patent rights and
copyright rights may exist simultaneously in the same software, the
policy governing such technology should consider both sets of rights. 190
Unlike copyright, patent law does not distinguish among
technologies. 191 If the doctrine of patent exhaustion is insufficient to
permit the free use of incidental software copies, it should also not
apply to self-replicating seeds. 192
The potential solutions to this problem-congressional action,
licenses, or the creation of a fair use doctrine-either conflict with
traditional patent law theory or suffer from limitations of scope and
effectiveness. A technology-specific statutory exemption in patent
law, like those found in § 117 of the Copyright Act, would likely
187.
There are some scenarios where software has found a haven under the fair use
doctrine. In Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., for example, the Ninth Circuit
held that modification of copyright software for personal use was fair. See 964 F.2d 965, 970 (9th
Cir. 1992) (agreeing with the lower court "that 'a family's use of a Game Genie for private home
enjoyment must be characterized as a non-commercial, nonprofit activity'). Similarly, in Sega
Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that making copies in the course of
reverse engineering is a fair use when it is the only way to get access to the "ideas and functional
elements" in the copyrighted code and when "there is a legitimate reason for seeking such
access." Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1992).
188.
See, e.g., Sega, 977 F.2d at 1525 ("The record makes clear that disassembly is
wholesale copying.").
189.
See id. at 1517.
190.
Cohen & Lemley, supra note 43, at 27.
191.
Arthur J. Gajarsa, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, Lecture at the
Fifth Annual Honorable Helen Wilson Nies Memorial Lecture in Intellectual Property: Quo
Vadis? (Apr. 22, 2002), in 6 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2002) ("[The courts] also need to
determine whether or not we should have a different standard of patentability for biotech cases
and also for software. Should there be a different patentability standard that is established by
decision of our court or by statute?").
192.
See supra Part IV.A.
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conflict with the policies underlying the patent system. 193 Licenses
are readily available in patent law but limit the use of the technology
through privity of contract, excluding Bowman's particular use (that
is, where allowing the use of the article also allows unlimited
reproduction). 19 4 Lastly, as discussed below, the introduction of a fair
use doctrine in patent law has multiple supporters, but to apply it,
self-replicating technologies would create a self-serving, narrow
doctrine that does not find support in the rationales underpinning the
patent system.19 5
1. Congressional Action
While parties have litigated the question of patent exhaustion
for over a decade, Congress has not resolved the question for the
courts.1 9 6 Agribusiness ranks as one of the most influential lobbying
sectors, spending over $1.5 billion on lobbying from 1998-2012.197
Monsanto's lobbying arm alone has averaged over $7 million each year
for the past five years, including attempts to influence the America
Invents Act and the Patent Reform Act of 2009.198 Yet Congress
remains silent.
Even if Congress passed a statutory exception for
self-replicating biotechnology, it would fail to provide the same
balance of equities found in the copyright code. 199 The essential-step
193.
See supra Part IV.B.1 (explaining that the essential-step defense in copyright relies
on the premise that the use of the article does not affect the other party's distribution right).
194.
Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("The Technology
Agreement signed by Bowman extended only to seeds purchased from Monsanto or a licensed
dealer; thus, Bowman's use of the commodity seeds was not within the scope of the agreement."),
cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 420 (2012).
195.
See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward A Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1180 (2000); S. Carran Daughtrey, Note, Reverse Engineeringof Software
for Interoperability and Analysis, 47 VAND. L. REV. 145, 183-84 (1994); infra Part IV.C.3
(explaining why self-replicating technologies are too narrow to justify a fair use doctrine in
patent law).
196.
The Federal Circuit decided the first of the three existing seed cases in 2002. See
McFarlingI, 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
197.
Influence & Lobbying: Ranked Sectors (1998-2012),
OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?indexType=c (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).
198.
Influence & Lobbying: Lobbying-Monsanto Co. (2012), OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/search.php (search "Search by name" for "Monsanto"; then
follow "Monsanto Co" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 20, 2013); Influence & Lobbying: Monsanto
Co. Bills Lobbied (2011), OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/search.php
(search "Search by name" for "Monsanto"; then follow "Monsanto Co" hyperlink; then select
"Bills" tab; then select "2011" under "Year") (last visited Jan. 20, 2013); Influence & Lobbying:
Monsanto Co.-Bills Lobbied (2010), OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/
search.php (search "Search by name" for "Monsanto"; then follow "Monsanto Co" hyperlink; then
select "Bills" tab; then select "2010" under "Year") (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).
199.
See supra Part IV.B.1.
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defense weighs the value of the consumer's right to use the work
against the right holder's ability to control the distribution of his
work. 200 It strikes this balance by allowing only essential or incidental
copies. 20 1 The scope of the reproduction is extremely limited, the
reproduction is difficult to copy to another medium, and it presents
little danger of misappropriation. 2 02 Seeds hold no such limitations. 203
Each Monsanto soybean plant yields an average of 85.8 new seeds,
enabling farmers to pluck them from the stem and replant them
without any additional effort. Further, while the license typically
permits the use of the RAM copy, the software user does not own it.204
The same cannot readily be said for the seeds produced from the
farmer's plants. 205 The ease of misappropriation and distribution and
the questionable ownership of the incidental seed copies upset the
balance needed for an equitable statutory amendment. 206
2. Licenses
Similar to copyright, licenses prove to be the most easily
adapted and versatile solution; however, the need for privity of
contract to grant the right to make precludes Bowman's use.
Monsanto's technology agreements are similar to software licenses,
allowing limited replications in pursuit of utilizing the good. 207 Unlike
software, though, the process will consume the patented article that
provides the input and blueprint for reproduction. 2 08 This inherently
See Leska, supra note 167, at 100.
200.
201.
See 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (2006) ("[A] new copy or adaptation [that] is created as an
essential step in the utilization of the computer program ... and ... used in no other manner [is
not an infringement].").
202.
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617, 622 (C.D. Cal. 1984)
("[Tihe type of copying authorized by the statute must be no more permanent than is reasonably
necessary."), aff'd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984).
203.
Incidental software copies are typically limited to only a few per machine, are
erased from RAM on each shutdown, and require additional effort to extract the copy from the
RAM for use elsewhere. See Apple Computer, 594 F. Supp. at 622 (finding that RAM copies are
created only when the software is being used, are temporary, and are erased when the computer
is shut down). Conversely, seeds reproduce exponentially, will remain in existence indefinitely,
and can create replicas simply from being dropped on the ground. See More Beans Per Pod, supra
note 4 (explaining that seeds replicate at rates of eighty-to-one without loss of genetic material).
204.
See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993).
205.
The farmer-to-granary sale and the granary-to-Bowman sale are both valid and
without the licensing restrictions from Monsanto's technology agreement. See Monsanto Co. v.
Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 420 (2012).
206.
See supra Part IV.B.1.
207.
See Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1344-45 (restricting the use to a single crop that then
must be sold as commodity seed and not replanted).
208.
See Jeff Schalau, How Seeds Work, THE BACKYARD GARDENER (Feb. 1, 2007),
http://cals.arizona.edu/yavapailanr/hort/byg/archivehowseedswork.html (explaining germination
and the self-contained reproductive system of a seed). Seeds naturally cannibalize themselves in
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limited duration and purpose restrict the licensing option.209 The need
for economic feasibility requires Monsanto to allow the farmers at
least one use for the resulting seeds, and Monsanto chose to allow the
sale of commodity seeds as that one use. 210 Because the second farmer
is the owner of the seeds pursuant to an authorized sale and not a
licensee, the patent holder does not receive the same benefits as a
211
copyright holder in a similar position.
For the patent holder of self-replicating technology,
contractually restricted sales, like those involving Monsanto's
technology agreements, may provide the only protection available. 212
Utilizing contract law allows each separate technology to find its own
balance, a considerable value given the variety of crops Monsanto
alone markets-from soybeans to cotton to sugar beets. 213 As the
patent holder, Monsanto has the authority to grant both the right to
use and to make the self-replicating technology. 214 This contract-law
solution, however, fails to settle the question of patent exhaustion and
Bowman's predicament. 215

the pursuit of creating replicas. See id. Questions arise on how to compensate the rights holder:
Should the license be revoked after planting? Are they entitled to the planted seeds, the progeny
of those seeds once grown, or simply monetary compensation? Compare this situation to a
violation of the incidental copy of a software program where a single CD may be returned or the
program remotely deactivated and locked.
209.
Both the seeds purchased from Monsanto and their progeny have utility only if sold
or planted, and once planted, the original seeds cannot then be sold, creating a zero-sum game
that Monsanto built its licensing around. See supra note 38 (listing the restrictions placed on
Monsanto seeds). The first generation of purchased seeds must be planted, while the
second-generation progeny must be sold. See Yee Wah Chin, Inexhaustible: Patents on SelfReplicating Technologies, 3 LANDSLIDE 12, 16 (2011).

210.
It makes sense that for farmers to have an incentive to purchase Monsanto seeds,
the agribusiness must allow at least one permissible use for the resulting second-generation
seeds. Farmers already have the option to purchase soybeans from the local granary. See
Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1345. Monsanto offers an improved version of soybeans, but their benefits,
such as higher yields, cannot be realized without planting them. See More Beans Per Pod, supra
note 4. Even after harvesting, the crop is just a hill of beans unless they can be sold or used in
some other fashion.
211.
Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2010) (showing that a
copyright owner can avoid the application of the first sale doctrine, even with regards to
incidental copies, by merely licensing its product instead of selling it). While Autodesk could
prevent Vernor from selling his second-hand CDs for lack of an authorized sale, Monsanto has no
such hook with Bowman. See id. at 1115.
212.
See, e.g., 2011 Monsanto Technology/StewardshipAgreement (Limited Use License),
supra note 9.

213.
U.S. Technology Use Guide, supra note 7, at 1, 17.
214.
See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
215.
See Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1346-48 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining
that regardless of the fact that "Bowman's use of the commodity seeds was not within the scope
of the [Technology} agreement," when the commodity seeds are planted and "the next generation
of seed develops, the grower has created a newly infringing article"), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 420
(2012).
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3. Fair Use
In the absence of a statutory exception or specific contract,
perhaps Bowman's actions deserve a fair use exemption. Multiple
scholars have suggested a fair use standard in patent law over the
years to address issues ranging from failures in the licensing market
to enabling quicker adaptation of patent scope to keep pace with the
speed of technological evolution. 216 While some call for a universal
doctrine, others suggest only applying it to those industries showing a
net need. 217 The suggested tests often mirror those codified in the
Copyright Act, which instructs the courts to analyze the commercial
nature of the infringement, its effect on the market, the nature of the
work infringed, and any transformative or innovative additions to the
infringing article. 218
While the fair use doctrine may effectively balance equities in
copyright, self-replicating technology does not justify extending fair
use to patents. First, where its copyright equivalent acts as a buffer
for First Amendment rights, the First Amendment is irrelevant in
patent law, which addresses only market issues and economic
rights.2 19 Second, the technology lacks the criteria necessary to garner
protection under the fair use test. The technology itself is highly
commercial in nature, and its use creates exact replicas containing no

216.
See, e.g., O'Rourke, supra note 195, at 1180.
217.
See Joshua I. Miller, Towards a Doctrine of Fair Use in Some of Patent Law, 2
should instead only apply to industries and
INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 56, 57 (2011) ("[Flair use ...
technologies that raise network effect concerns."); O'Rourke, supra note 195, at 1205 ("The lack
of any universal principle accounting for differences between the copyright and patent incentive
schemes suggests that there may be such cases in patent law as well.").
218.
O'Rourke presents one variation of the relevant factors:
[F]ive factors relevant to a fair use finding: (i) the nature of the advance represented
by the infringement; (ii) the purpose of the infringing use; (iii) the nature and strength
of the market failure that prevents a license from being concluded; (iv) the impact of
the use on the patentee's incentives and overall social welfare; and (v) the nature of
the patented work.
O'Rourke, supra note 195, at 1205. The US Code, by comparison, lists the following as the
relevant fair use factors:
[Flactors to be considered shall include-(1) the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
219.
Patent law does not have the accompanying First Amendment considerations that
spurred the need for a fair use doctrine in copyright. See KRANICH, supra note 184, at 7
(discussing fair use and the first sale rule as "traditional safety valves [that] balance the public's
interest in open access with the property interests of copyright owners"). Instead, it would serve
primarily as a market adjustment, transferring economic rights and benefits (the right to make)
from the patent holder to the consumer.
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more (or less) innovation than the original. Likewise, the activity
would effectively cannibalize the market for the existing product until
no market remained. 220 While one can imagine noncommercial uses, a
doctrine of fair use should require more than very rare scenarios for
support. 221
V. DUAL EXPLICIT LICENSES BEST PROTECT SELF-REPLICATING
TECHNOLOGIES

The best option for controlling patent rights in self-replicating
products lies in the courts refusing to apply patent exhaustion and
allowing the industry to rely on explicit licenses to use and to
reproduce patented technology. The rights held by a patentee are best
viewed as a bundle-distinct and divisible. 222 The patent exhaustion
doctrine removes a single particular article from patent protection, to
be used and resold at the whim of its new owner. 223 Purchasing the
good does not grant the right to reproduce it.224 The right to
reproduce-and the ability to assign that right-rests with the patent
holder. 225
Quanta's patent exhaustion test attempts to grant the right to
use an article that embodies the patent. 226 With self-replicating
technology, however, using and making the invention are one and the
same. 227 Where the act of using and making are so inescapably
intertwined, the purchaser must obtain authorization to perform both
actions.228

220.
See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
221.
It is possible to construct a hypothetical, noncommercial technology that is both
innovative in its own right and is capable of increasing in innovation when replicated without
affecting the market for the original. See Jeremy Sheff, Self-Replicating Technologies, PATENTLY0 (Apr. 30, 2012, 2:27 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/04/self-replicatingtechnologies.html (citing nanomedicine as a self-replicating technology that is so personalized
that reproduction would not be marketable). Given the examples from past and present (seeds,
biotechnology, software, etc.), this would be an oddity without comparison. See supra Part I.A-B
(describing seeds and software as innovative self-replicating technologies that reduce the market
for the original when copied illicitly).
222.
See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
223.
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
224.
See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
225.
See supranote 149 and accompanying text.
226.
See supraPart II.C.
227.
See supranotes 11-14 and accompanying text.
228.
See Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (requiring
that a license be signed to obtain the right to both use the seed and make copies), cert. granted,
133 S. Ct. 420 (2012). The technology agreement extends beyond the dichotomy of planting
versus selling-it includes provisions for not supplying the seed to others for crop breeding,
research, or herbicide-registration data collection. Id. at 1346.
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self-replicating
for
requirements
The joint-permission
technologies create two possible types of sales. The first sale from
Monsanto to the farmer includes full authorization both to use and to
make the seeds. 229 Monsanto limits this authorization-which is
within its power-to a single generation of crops. 230 The authorization
does not extend to the second-, third-, or nth-generation seeds. 231
Whether or not the patent exhaustion doctrine extends to the
subsequent generations of seeds remains irrelevant because farmers
cannot replant the seeds without the authorization to "make" as
well. 232

The second type of sale relates both to when the farmer sells
his crop to the granary and to when the granary sells commodity seed
to another farmer. Monsanto sanctions the former as far as it
comports with the technology agreement signed by the farmer. 233 The
latter transaction from granary to farmer is one step removed from
the initial Monsanto technology agreement and suffers none of the
accompanying restrictions. 2 3 4 While these transactions could arguably
trigger the patent exhaustion doctrine under Quanta,235 they lack
Monsanto's authorization to "make" the invention that would allow
replanting of the seeds. As limited by the technology agreement, 236
the farmer lacks the authority to grant the "right to make" to the
granary, and the granary never had the authority to assign the right
to its buyer.237 It would make little sense to allow any vendor with the
right to sell an invention to also grant the right to reproduce it. The
right to reproduce should remain with the patent holder and its
designees.

229.
See id. at 1344-45.
230.
See id. at 1345.
231.
See id.
See supra note 148 and accompanying text. Under a theory of dual permissions, the
232.
exhaustion of the right to use would not include an accompanying exhaustion of the right to
make. See Osborne, supra note 55, at 648. The latter must be obtained from the rights holder or
another authorized entity. See id.
See Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1345 (explaining how Monsanto prohibits all sales of
233.
first-generation seeds and allows sale of second-generation seeds only to local granaries as
commodity seeds).
See id. at 1346.
234.
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
235.
236.
Cf. supra note 176 and accompanying text.
237.
See Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1346; see also Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102,
1112 (9th Cir. 2010).
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A. Alignment with Patent Policies
Requiring grants for both rights creates bright-line rules that
fit well within established patent law principles. 238 Strong incentives
are necessary to protect self-replicating technologies from the
economic dangers of misappropriation. 2 39
The requirement also
provides a certainty which is currently lacking and encourages further
innovation. 240
Supporting a strong patent system removes the
complications that would arise by applying the exhaustion doctrine
and requiring the patent holder to maintain contractual privity to
protect its investment. 24 1
1. Competitive Economic Rationale
Instituting patent exhaustion at the first point of sale for
self-replicating technologies would create an environment that
punishes innovation and rewards parasitic behavior.
Where the
technology at issue is an input for a production cycle with exponential
returns, the sale of customer seed at each generation would
significantly erode the patentee's revenue stream. 242 The situation
would make it potentially impossible for the inventor to recoup its
sizable investment in research and development required to create the
technology in the first place. 2 4 3

This is the classic free-rider problem, and it is particularly
relevant for inventions that are easy to copy once they have been
introduced to the public. 244
Self-replicating technologies only
exacerbate this problem since they provide both the input and the

238.
See Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformity
Principle, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1619, 1620 (2007) (identifying uniformity, encouraging
technological innovation, and providing predictable litigation rules as criteria for evaluating
Federal Circuit precedent).
239.
Allowing even a single self-replicating article to circumvent patent law has the
potential of destroying the entire market for the good. See supra note 127 and accompanying
text.

240.
See supra Part II.C.
241.
See Chin, supra note 209, at 16 (advocating a second layer of licensing in which
farmers could sell their commodity seed only to granaries who have signed contracts to not resell
the seeds for planting).
242.
See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
243.
See Why Does Monsanto Sue Farmers Who Save Seeds?, supra note 5.
244.
Jason Savich, Note, Monsanto v. Scruggs: The Negative Impact of Patent Exhaustion
on Self-Replicating Technology, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 120 (2007) ("Absent such
protection, free-riders who do not bear the costs of R & D, could quickly copy the invention and
capitalize on the inventor's work.").
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process for practicing the invention. 245 One solution to this economic
conundrum, albeit a poor one, involves incorporating the present value
of all future sales into the price for the first sale. 2 4 6 Where it now
costs an Indiana farmer $50 per acre to plant Roundup Ready
soybeans, the price could rise to $50,000 or more per acre if the initial
price reflects all the possible future earnings represented by that one
Presumably, no farmer could afford such an
bag of seeds. 247
exorbitant cost and would not buy seeds. Monsanto must then either
drop the price or not sell at all. 2 4 8 Furthermore, faced with such a
scenario, Monsanto has no incentive to create new and better seeds. 249
Such a price would be more detrimental than the free-rider problem,
as neither the public nor the inventor would benefit. 250
2. Innovative Rationale
Perhaps the most fundamental rationale behind the US patent
system lies in the belief that an exclusionary monopoly induces
innovation by allowing inventors to recoup the costs associated with
their research. 251 Progress is rarely the result of a flash of genius and
is more often the product of diligence and hard work. 2 5 2 Removing the
inventor's ability to exclude others from practicing the patent
diminishes his incentive to invent in the first place. 2 5 3 Even if an

Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the
245.
Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REv. 81, 105 (applying the "free-rider 'incentive to invent' analysis"
to self-disclosing technologies).
246.
Posting of Yee Wah Chin, to Jeremy Sheff, Self-Replicating Technologies,
PATENTLY-O (May 1, 2012, 12:42 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/04/self-replicatingtechnologies.html.
247.
These numbers are entirely hypothetical. For a more mathematically sound
analysis, however, consider that one seed may create a plant with fifty new seeds, each of which
is capable of creating a similar plant. After two growing cycles, one seed has become 2,500 seeds,
and after three seasons, 125,000 seeds. Thus, Monsanto must price a single seed equivalent to
the value of over one hundred thousand seeds to capture the value lost if the right to make is
exhausted.
248.
See Sheff, supra note 221.
249.
See id.
250.
See id.
See Estelle Derclaye, Eudemonic Intellectual Property:Patents and Related Rights
251.
as Engines of Happiness, Peace, and Sustainability, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 495, 500-01
(2012).
See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 15 (1966) (rejecting the
252.
"flash of creative genius" test for patentability (quoting Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices
Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941))).
253.
See Niels Melius, Trolling for Standards:How Courts and the Administrative State
Can Help Deter Patent Holdup and Promote Innovation, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 161, 169
(2012) ("[B] ecause companies produce an invention only if it can be profitable, patent exclusivity
allows an inventor to recover research and development costs, prevents free-riding, and thus
creates incentives for innovation.").
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inventor does decide to invest the time, energy, and funds necessary
for proper research, the inventor will prefer to retain his work as a
trade secret because the patent system will offer no protection or
financial incentive. 254 This deprives the public of the new knowledge.
3. Why Licenses and Contracts Are Unnecessarily Convoluted
Reliance on contract law for post-sale restrictions is convoluted
and does not address the primary issue of incentivizing innovation
without creating unnecessary burdens on consumers. 255 Bowman
purchased the commodity seeds from his local grain elevator without
any restrictions or encumbrances. 2 5 6 Monsanto was not a party in the
transaction in any sense other than being the patent holder of the
The current license and
technology imbued in the product. 257
post-sale-restriction frameworks are insufficient to prevent the
unencumbered sale of patented seeds to farmers. 258
For Monsanto to control the product, it must control each step
in the process.

259

Monsanto would need to require the farmers to

purchase the seed directly from Monsanto, promising only to plant a
single crop and not save or reuse the seeds. 260 Additionally, Monsanto
would need to require the farmers to sell their crops only to
Monsanto-certified granaries. 261 Monsanto would need to enter into
contractual relationships with each granary, requiring the granaries
to keep the patented seed separate from unpatented seed and to sell
the patented seed only if the purchaser signs another technology
agreement. 262
This setup is far from desirable for a number of reasons. Most
importantly, it requires Monsanto to vertically integrate itself
throughout the entire seed business. 263 It would need to act as
inventor, producer, seller, and storage-facility owner. 264 Not only
placing a large financial burden on the agribusiness, the setup also is
likely to conflict with antitrust proponents, who already argue that
254.
See James W. Beard, The Limits of Licensing: Quanta v. LGE and the New Doctrine
of Simultaneous Exhaustion, 2008 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 3, 4-5.
255.
See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
256.
Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S.
Ct. 420 (2012).
257.
See id. at 1346.
258.
See id.
259.
See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
260.
See Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1344-45.
261.
See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
262.
See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
263.
See Sheff, supra note 221.
264.
See id.
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Monsanto abuses its substantial market influence. 265 A simple and
straightforward dual-permission requirement for self-replicating
technologies avoids this confusion, while still providing adequate
incentives for investment and innovation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Self-replicating technologies have brought fresh discussion to
groundbreaking
of patents-particularly
among
the
scope
biotechnological creations. While the traditional patent exhaustion
doctrine would remove the patent holder's ability to control the use of
a sold item, complications arise when to use the article requires
making the patented article as well. The rationale supporting the
classic patent exhaustion doctrine is insufficient to support exhaustion
of both patent rights. Software and copyright law offer alternative
legal frameworks, including technology-specific statutory exceptions,
licensing arrangements, and the fair use doctrine. The unique issues
surrounding self-replicating technologies, however, fail to align with
the frameworks' underlying rationales. Ultimately, only robust patent
rights and a refusal to apply the patent exhaustion doctrine to actions
like Bowman's comport with patent law's purpose of advancing
innovation and the sciences.
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